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THE ALASKA DYNASTY TRUST
STEPHEN E. GREER*
This Article aims to illustrate the unique benefits of utilizing
a dynasty trust in Alaska. The fundamental dynamics of a
dynasty trust are explained, as well as the advantages of locating such a trust in Alaska. Alaska has the advantage of
avoiding the Delaware Tax Trap and provides superior
creditor protection to beneficiaries. Four different drafting
techniques designed to achieve creditor protection are suggested and discussed. Finally, some observations about
drafting in light of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 are highlighted.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Article is to familiarize the unacquainted
with dynasty trusts and the unique advantages that Alaska has over
other dynasty jurisdictions. The Alaskan advantages, which allow
taxpayers to avoid the Delaware Tax Trap and afford greater creditor protection to beneficiaries, are discussed in detail. The passage
of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
1
2001 (“EGTRRA”) has made dynasty trusts a centerpiece of estate planning. Dynasty trusts have come to the forefront because
many estate planning practitioners feel estate and generationskipping taxes will not be repealed, or if repeal does occur, these
taxes will once again reappear. If assets can be transferred tax-free
to a dynasty trust prior to the re-enactment of new estate tax legislation, then these assets might escape any future estate and genera2
tion-skipping tax. The focus of this Article is an Alaskan third1. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
2. This assumes any future estate and generation-skipping tax would not be
retroactively imposed. If a retroactive tax was imposed, it would be difficult to
challenge as the courts have repeatedly upheld retroactive tax legislation against
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party settled trust, where an Alaskan settlor establishes a trust
(most typically at death, but it can also be established during life)
for the benefit of individuals other than himself. The Alaskan selfsettled trust, where the settlor is retained as a discretionary benefi3
ciary, will not be discussed.
A dynasty trust is an irrevocable trust intended to benefit successive generations of beneficiaries. The settlor of a dynasty trust
usually has two objectives. The first objective is to protect the assets for the longest possible period of time from the eroding effect
of federal transfer taxes while making the assets available for future generations. These transfer taxes are the federal gift tax, the
estate tax and the generation-skipping tax. The second objective is
to protect the trust assets from claims that may be brought by a
beneficiary’s creditors. To accomplish both objectives, the assets
must be permitted to continue in trust.
Under the Rule Against Perpetuities, beneficial interests must
at some point vest and the trust assets be distributed to the beneficiaries. Once the assets are distributed to the beneficiaries, both
transfer tax and creditor protection are lost. As a result, dynasty
trusts work best in states, such as Alaska, that have either abolished or extended the Rule Against Perpetuities. Other states that
have eliminated the Rule include Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
4
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Virginia. Florida exdue process challenges. For example, a provision in 26 U.S.C. § 2057, enacted in
December 1987, but retroactive to October 1986, which set forth qualifications for
the deduction of the sale of employer securities by the executor of an estate to an
employee stock-ownership plan was upheld. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26
(1994). In addition, a retroactive increase in the estate and gift tax rates under the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 was upheld where there was a retroactive restoration of the maximum estate and gift tax rates of 55% and 53%, although the maximum rates had been reduced to 50% approximately seven months
earlier. Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 1999); NationsBank v.
United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 661, 666 (1999).
3. The self-settled trust permitted under Alaska law has been the subject of
extensive commentary. See, e.g., R. Hompesch II, Domestic Asset Protection
Trusts: More Might Than First Appears, 1 ASSET PROTECTION JOURNAL, #2 at 19;
G. Rothschild, D. Rubin, & J. Blattmachr, Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a
Few Bad Apples Spoil the Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (1999).
4. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2901 (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-15-120 (2000);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (Michie 2000); 765
ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §101-A (West 2000);
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS §11-102 (2000); Act of May 18, 2001, sec. A 2001
Mo. Legis. Serv. 3, 563 (West) (to be codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 456.236); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.09 (Anderson
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tended the “wait and see” period set forth in its version of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (“USRAP”) from 90
5
years to 360 years, and Washington extended this period to 150
6
years.
On April 2, 1997, Alaska effectively eliminated its Rule
Against Perpetuities with regard to beneficial interests held in
trust, but only where all or part of the income or principal of the
trust could be distributed at the trustee’s discretion to a person who
7
was living when the trust was created. Thus, the door opened for
Alaska dynasty trusts. As will be discussed, Alaska’s Rule Against
Perpetuities statute was amended in 2000 and again in 2001. Nonetheless, it can still be said that Alaska has abolished the Rule except in a very limited circumstance where it has been extended to
1000 years. Because dynasty trusts provide enormous advantages
for the beneficiaries, repeal legislation of this type is a growing
trend. In the meantime, states that have not enacted similar dynasty trust legislation face the threat of having their capital base
eroded as individuals move their assets into jurisdictions such as
Alaska that permit dynasty trusts.
II. ACCOMPLISHING THE TAX OBJECTIVE
The diminishing effect of the federal transfer tax can be demonstrated by a simple illustration. Assume $1 million is placed in
trust and the assets grow at an annual after-tax return of 5%. Assume further that this amount is distributed outright, and that
every thirty years the assets are passed on to a succeeding genera8
tion but are subject to an estate tax rate of 50%. After 120 years,
$1 million would grow to $21,806,999. However, if $1 million were
held in a trust, without the beneficiaries having sufficient rights of

2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-3 (Michie
2001); WIS. STAT. § 700.16 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (Michie 2001).
5. FLA. STAT. ch. 737.4032 (2000).
6. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.130 (2001).
7. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (Michie 1997).
8. It should be noted that section 511(c) of EGTRRA reduces the top estate
tax rate from 55% to 50% in the year 2002, and this rate is thereafter reduced by
one percentage point each succeeding year. In the year 2007, the top rate will be
45%, and it will stay at this rate until 2010 at which point the estate tax will be repealed. The estate tax will be resurrected in 2011, and the highest rate will once
again be 55%. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, § 511(a)-(c), 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
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ownership to warrant inclusion of the trust assets in their estate tax
base, this amount would grow to $348,911,561.9
A. Intervivos and Testamentary Dynasty Trusts
Dynasty trusts can be created during a settlor’s life or at his
death. A trust created during life is established as an irrevocable
trust. The transfer of the settlor’s assets to the trust constitutes a
gift to the beneficiaries of the trust. The most an individual settlor
can contribute to the trust without the imposition of gift tax is an
10
amount equal to the settlor’s unused applicable exclusion amount.
In 2001, this amount is $675,000; however, as a result of EGTRRA,
this amount increases to $1 million in 2002 and remains constant in
the future. Under the gift and estate tax regime in place prior to
the enactment of EGTRRA, the applicable exclusion amount was
unified. If an individual’s applicable exclusion amount is eliminated through lifetime gifts, an estate tax would have to be paid at
death if the recipient is not a public charity or a U.S. citizen spouse.
EGTRRA changes the unified structure of the gift and estate tax
regimes by exacting a gift tax on any lifetime gifts in excess of $1
million, despite the fact that the estate tax might be eliminated.
Retaining the gift tax protects the income tax regime by preventing
wealthy individuals from transferring assets to individuals whose
income tax rate is lower than their own.
Because one purpose of a dynasty trust is to have the assets
available for the use of future generations, it is essential that the
trust be exempted from the imposition of the generation-skipping
transfer (“GST”) tax. In 2001, a flat generation-skipping tax of
55% is imposed on distributions of trust property that benefits individuals two or more generations removed from the settlor (“skip
beneficiaries”). The 55% rate is scheduled to decrease, but it will
always be equal to the highest estate tax rate during the years 2002
through 2009. Because a dynasty trust by its nature is meant to
benefit individuals two or more generations removed from the settlor, the possibility exists that a GST tax will be imposed, either
immediately when the trust is formed if all beneficiaries are skip
individuals, or later when the trust assets are distributed to a skip
beneficiary. The only way to avoid the GST tax is for the trust to
be exempt from it. Each individual has the ability to exempt a certain amount from this tax. The GST exemption in 2001 is
11
$1,060,000, and that amount is increased for inflation in 2002 and
9. R. OSHINS & J. BLATTMACHR, The Megatrust: An Ideal Family Wealth
Preservation Tool, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 20, 22 (1991).
10. I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2001).
11. Id. § 2631(c).

GREER_FMT.DOC

258

11/01/01 3:16 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

2003. In 2004 and subsequent years, the GST exemption will equal
the amount that can be transferred estate tax-free.12 The GST exemption will disappear when the GST tax is repealed in 2010, then
will revert back to $1,060,000 with a cost of living adjustment in
13
2011 when the GST tax is restored. To avoid the GST tax, the settlor must allocate GST exemption in an amount equal to the value
of the assets contributed to the trust. The settlor will allocate this
exemption on a gift tax return filed for the year in which the gift
was made. Assuming GST exemption was allocated to the trust in
an amount equal to the fair market value of the assets contributed
to the trust, the trust assets will be exempt forever from the GST
tax when the assets are distributed to skip beneficiaries.
It is doubtful many individuals will want to make intervivos
gifts to a dynasty trust if they have to pay a gift tax, particularly if
the assets can be transferred at death free of estate and GST taxes.
It is more likely the settlor of an intervivos dynasty trust will instead want to leverage the amount that can be gifted free of the gift
tax. Assume the settlor wants to establish an intervivos dynasty
trust in 2002. The most that can be transferred free of the gift tax is
$1 million. Instead of transferring $1 million directly to the trust,
the settlor could first contribute assets worth $1 million to a limited
liability company (“LLC”) and thereafter gift his LLC interests to
the trust. The amount of the gift would be the fair market value of
the LLC interest, and not the underlying pro-rata value of the assets held in the LLC. The fair market value of the LLC interest
being gifted should be discounted to reflect its lack of marketability
and any lack of control that can be attributed to the gifted inter14
est.
To preserve the trust estate from the imposition of state income tax, the trust should be sitused in a state that does not impose
state income taxes, or alternatively the assets should be invested in
a manner where income tax liability is reduced. In this regard,
Alaska provides an additional advantage to the settlors of dynasty
trusts in that there is no state income tax. Furthermore, if a trust is
considered a grantor trust under the rules set out in sections 671679 of the I.R.C., the federal income taxes on the income earned by
the trust will be taxed to the settlor at the settlor’s rates and not by
the trust at the onerous income tax rates of trusts. The payment of
the income taxes by the settlor not only preserves the corpus of the
12. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 521(c)(2), 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
13. Id. § 901.
14. See Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981);
Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202-03.
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trust, but also the payment of the taxes is not considered an additional gift by the settlor to the trust.15
Because many individuals are hesitant to make lifetime gifts,
dynasty trusts are often funded at death. Presently, the estate tax
applicable exclusion amount is $675,000. Under EGTRRA the applicable exclusion amount is scheduled to increase as follows: $1
million in 2002 and 2003, $1.5 million in 2004 and 2005, $2 million
in 2006, 2007 and 2008, $3.5 million in 2009, with no estate tax in
2010 and then back to $1 million in 2011. As previously mentioned, the GST exemption commencing in 2004 tracks the estate
tax applicable exclusion amount. If the decedent dies with a taxable estate in excess of his remaining applicable exclusion amount,
an estate tax will have to be paid prior to funding a testamentary
dynasty trust.
B. Exempt and Non-Exempt Dynasty Trusts
If an amount in excess of the decedent’s unused GST exemption is contributed to the trust, the trust should always be divided
into two trusts. One trust will have the decedent’s remaining GST
exemption allocated to it. This trust is referred to as an “exempt
trust.” Any amount in excess of the decedent’s remaining GST ex16
emption will be distributed to a “non-exempt trust.”
Whether formed during life or at death, an “exempt trust” is
typically structured so that the assets can pass from one generation
to the next without the imposition of an estate tax. The key is not
to give a beneficiary sufficient right or control over the trust assets
so as to cause inclusion of the assets in the beneficiary’s gross estate. A beneficiary can be given rights that almost equate to ownership without these rights requiring estate tax inclusion. For example, a beneficiary could be named as the trustee of the trust and
be given a right to all the income and the right to consume principal limited by an ascertainable standard, which can relate to the
beneficiary’s support in the beneficiary’s accustomed manner of
17
living. Additional flexibility can be given to the beneficiary to address future circumstances by giving the beneficiary a testamentary
non-general power to appoint the assets of the trust to anyone in
the world, provided that the power to appoint cannot be made ex15. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-20-021 (Feb. 13, 2001).
16. I.R.C. § 2654(b) (2000); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 562, 115 Stat. 89 (2001) (amending section
2642(a) to allow the severing of a single trust into an exempt and non-exempt trust
on a fractional basis beyond the period of time in which severance is permitted in
the final regulations).
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1961).

GREER_FMT.DOC

260

11/01/01 3:16 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

ercisable in favor of the beneficiary, the beneficiary’s creditors or
creditors of the beneficiary’s estate.18 The trust assets can be appointed either outright or in trust. If the appointment is made in
trust, this trust can give succeeding beneficiaries the same rights
previously mentioned. If the beneficiary is entitled to income and
principal pursuant to an ascertainable standard, the beneficiary
should not be given an intervivos non-general power of appointment because the exercise of that power will constitute a gift by the
19
beneficiary.
A dynasty trust typically includes a non-skip individual as a
beneficiary (usually a child or someone only one generation removed). It is ordinarily better to expose a non-exempt trust to the
estate tax in a non-skip beneficiary’s estate rather than having it
subjected to the GST tax when the assets are distributed to skip
beneficiaries. The estate tax is progressive and will generally be
lower than the flat GST tax. To accomplish this, there could be a
savings clause in which a non-skip beneficiary is given a testamentary general power of appointment if a generation-skipping transfer would occur at the death of the non-skip beneficiary. Giving
the non-skip beneficiary a testamentary general power of appointment will cause the trust assets to be included in the non-skip bene20
ficiary’s taxable estate. If the non-skip beneficiary decides not to
exercise the testamentary general power of appointment and the
trust assets continue in trust for the benefit of the original settlor’s
descendants, then the non-skip beneficiary will be considered the
transferor for GST tax purposes. A decision can then be made
whether to allocate the deceased non-skip beneficiary’s GST exemption to the dynasty trust.
III. CREDITOR PROTECTION AND FOUR DIFFERENT
DRAFTING TECHNIQUES
In addition to protecting the trust assets from taxes, the dynasty trust will usually be structured in a manner that protects the
trust assets from claims brought by a beneficiary’s creditors. The
seminal case sanctioning the settlors’ ability to create trusts
wherein beneficial interests could be protected from creditor
21
claims is the United States Supreme Court case Nichols v. Eaton.
The following passage in that opinion sanctified spendthrift protec18. Id. § 20.2041-1(c)(1).
19. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-51-049 (Sept. 22, 1994).
20. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (2001) (bringing all property subject to a general
power of appointment into the donee’s gross estate).
21. 91 U.S. 716 (1875); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. a
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).
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tion: “Why a parent . . . who . . . wishes to use his own property in
securing [his child] . . . from . . . the vicissitudes of fortune and even
his own improvidence or incapacity for self-protection, should not
22
be permitted to do so, is not readily perceived.”
If the goal is to provide as much creditor protection as possible, the trust must contain a spendthrift provision with respect to
the beneficial interests held in trust. A spendthrift provision will
provide that the interest of a beneficiary cannot be either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred before the trustee’s delivery of the
23
interest to the beneficiary. Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110(b)
explicitly states that a creditor may not satisfy its claim out of a
beneficiary’s interest in trust except in those circumstances listed in
that subsection, all of which apply to the settlor and not to the
24
beneficiary. In Alaska, a valid spendthrift provision will protect
the trust assets from claims brought by the beneficiary’s creditors
as long as the assets remain in trust. The protection ends once the
assets are distributed to the beneficiary. However, this limited protection is extremely valuable. Once a creditor obtains a judgment
against a debtor, the creditor will typically have a writ of execution
25
issued against the property of the debtor. If the creditor is unable
to satisfy a claim out of the debtor’s beneficial interest, then the
creditor must wait until the trustee chooses to make a distribution
to the beneficiary. There is no statutory authority in Alaska for the
proposition that a creditor’s writ of execution can act as a continuing lien against future distributions that a trustee would choose to
26
make to a beneficiary.
In states other than Alaska, the protection available for beneficiaries against creditor claims is dependent on the beneficiary’s
22. Nichols, 91 U.S. at 727.
23. Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110 states, in pertinent part, that in restricting transfers of trust interests:
(a) A person who in writing transfers property in trust may provide that
the interest of a beneficiary of the trust may not be either voluntarily or
involuntarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to
the beneficiary by the trustee.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a) (Michie 2000).
24. The circumstances in which a beneficiary’s interest may be attached by the
settlor’s creditors are when (1) the transfer in trust was fraudulent with respect to
the settlor’s creditors; (2) the settlor has the power to unilaterally revoke the trust;
(3) a trust requires that all or a part of the trust’s income or principal must be distributed to the settlor; or (4) the settlor is in default for payments due under a
child support order. Id. § 34.40.110 (restricting transfers of trust interests).
25. Id. § 09.35.030.
26. Id. § 09.38.035 (stating that a writ of garnishment operates as a continuing
lien but is effective only with respect to earnings owed the debtor).
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entitlement to trust distributions, the beneficiary’s ability to control
those distributions and, most importantly, applicable state law. On
one end of the spectrum, the beneficiary might be a discretionary
beneficiary with no definable right to distributions. Creditor protection is at its greatest in a discretionary trust because the beneficiary is not entitled to receive distributions and is also unable to
control the decision-making process about who may receive distributions. At the other end of the spectrum, the settlor may want to
give the beneficiary an entitlement to trust distributions and also
the ability to exercise control over the trust, recognizing that some
creditor protection may be lost in the process.
This section of the Article discusses four different ways to
structure the beneficial interest. However, these methods are not
the only available approaches. In each example, unless otherwise
stated, it is presumed that a separate trust will be established for a
single primary beneficiary. A single primary beneficiary is defined
as an individual entitled to a current distribution of principal or income, as opposed to a pot trust in which there could be any number of beneficiaries. Furthermore, in each example it is presumed
that the beneficial interest will be subject to the spendthrift protec27
tion of Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110(b). A typical spendthrift
clause might read as follows:
With respect to each and every trust created by the terms
of this instrument, a beneficiary may disclaim or release
his or her interest in principal or income, but no beneficiary shall anticipate, assign, encumber, or subject to any
creditor’s claim or to legal process, any interest in principal
or income before its actual receipt by the beneficiary. The
beneficial and legal interests in this trust, its principal, and
its income shall be free from interference or control of any
beneficiary’s creditor and shall not be subject to claims of
any such creditor or liable to attachment, execution, bankruptcy or other process of law. The spendthrift provisions
enunciated in Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110 specifically
apply to each and every trust created by the terms of this
instrument.
A. Naming an Independent Trustee and Giving the Beneficiary a
Discretionary Interest Not Subject to a Standard, Coupled with
a Spendthrift Provision
A beneficial interest describing a discretionary interest not
subject to a distribution standard follows:
27. Id. § 34.40.110(b).
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The trustee may pay over or apply the net income and
principal thereof, to such extent, including the whole
thereof, and in such manner or manners and at such time
or times and in such amounts and proportions, as the trustee, in the exercise of its sole and absolute discretion, may
determine, to or for the benefit of the beneficiary during
the lifetime of the beneficiary. Any net income not so paid
over or applied shall be accumulated and added to the
principal of the trust at least annually and thereafter shall
be held, administered and disposed of as a part thereof.
1. Discretionary Trusts in General. The best way to protect a
beneficial interest is to give an independent trustee the ability to
28
make discretionary distributions to the beneficiary. The Second
Restatement takes the position that a beneficial interest cannot be
29
attached by a creditor if the beneficial interest is discretionary.
Nor can the interest of a discretionary beneficiary be reached by a
spouse or child for alimony or support by a creditor who provides
necessary supplies or services to the beneficiary or by a govern30
mental unit that may have a claim against the beneficiary. The
nature of the interest provides the protection; a creditor cannot
31
compel payment because the beneficiary cannot compel payment.
However, what is gained in creditor protection is lost in beneficiary
control.
The draft of the Third Restatement takes a dramatically different position with respect to the creditor protection available to a
beneficiary of a discretionary trust. The Third Restatement provides that regardless of how the discretionary trust is worded, if the

28. The concept of the independent trustee is critical in determining who can
serve as a trustee if the powers of the trustee are not to be attributed to the settlor
or beneficiary for tax purposes. For purposes of this Article, the term is defined as
an individual or corporation that is neither related nor subordinate to the settlor
or beneficiary within the meaning of I.R.C. section 672(c). Specifically, that section defines the term “related or subordinate party” as any nonadverse party who
is
(1) the grantor’s spouse if living with the grantor;
(2) any one of the following: The grantor’s father, mother, issue, brother
or sister; an employee of the grantor; a corporation or any employee of a
corporation in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are
significant from the viewpoint of voting control; a subordinate employee
of a corporation in which the grantor is an executive.
I.R.C. § 672(c) (2001).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959).
30. Id. § 157.
31. Id. § 155 cmt. b.
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settlor’s purpose is to provide for the beneficiary’s needs, and if it is
acceptable social policy that the beneficiary not be left without
support, then the trustee would be subject to a general standard of
reasonableness in determining whether a distribution should be
32
made to a beneficiary. A beneficiary’s need for support usually
includes the needs of those who might be dependent on the benefi33
ciary. Thus, children, spouses and ex-spouses would be able to
compel the trustee to make distributions to them in such an
amount as would be considered equitable under the circum34
stances.
It is evident that a loss of creditor protection would occur in a
discretionary trust if a dynasty jurisdiction adopts the new position
of the Third Restatement. It is also important to note the Uniform
Trust Code, as passed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on August 3, 2000, takes the same position as the Third Restatement regarding discretionary trusts. In
fact, the Uniform Trust Code adopts nearly every position taken in
the Third Restatement with respect to the manner in which trust
assets can be protected from claims brought by a creditor against
35
the beneficiary of a trust.
Alaska provides superior creditor protection, in part because
Alaska’s statutory spendthrift law protects the trust against claims
brought by creditors that the Third Restatement and Uniform
Trust Code might otherwise allow. As explained below, the spendthrift protection in Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110(b) protects
the trust assets against most, if not all, creditor claims, regardless of
whether trust distributions are within the trustee’s discretion or
whether the trustee is required to make distributions to the beneficiary.
2. Discretionary Trusts Coupled with a Spendthrift Provision.
A discretionary interest coupled with a spendthrift provision
merely prevents the discretionary interest, as vague as it may be,
from being either voluntarily or involuntarily transferred. If there
is no spendthrift clause and the beneficiary transfers his discretionary interest, the trustee will be liable to a creditor for any distributions the trustee makes to the beneficiary after notice that the
32.
1999).
33.
34.
35.
of the
ment.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF

TRUSTS § 60 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2,

Id.
Id.
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 502-03 (2000). As will be explained, section 505(b)
Uniform Trust Code differs from the position taken in the Third Restate-
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beneficial interest has been transferred to the creditor. Thus, the
spendthrift provision protects the trustee of a discretionary trust
who wants to make a distribution to an improvident beneficiary but
is unable to do so because the beneficiary had previously transferred his discretionary interest.
3. Removing the Independent Trustee. One of the principal
problems in giving an independent trustee the ability to make discretionary distributions to a beneficiary is there is no easy way to
remove an unwanted independent trustee. Giving a discretionary
beneficiary the unqualified right to remove and replace the independent trustee comes dangerously close to creating both an estate
tax problem and a creditor protection problem, as will be discussed
below.
a. The Tax Problem. From a tax perspective, the problem is
to avoid having the trustee’s power to make discretionary distributions, not limited by an ascertainable standard, attributed to the
beneficiary. If this power is so attributed, the beneficiary will be
considered to have a general power of appointment. If the beneficiary has a general power of appointment, then the trust assets will
be included in the beneficiary’s estate. Estate Tax Regulation section 20.2041-1(b)(1) provides that if under the terms of the trust instrument, the trustee or his successor has the power to appoint the
principal of the trust, in a manner that is not limited by an ascertainable standard, for the benefit of individuals including himself,
and a beneficiary has the unrestricted power to remove or discharge
the trustee at any time and appoint any other person including
himself as trustee, then the beneficiary has a general power of ap36
pointment. On the other hand, the power of the trustee to appoint the principal of the trust will not be attributed to the beneficiary if the beneficiary can remove the trustee “for cause.”
It is unclear if a discretionary beneficiary with an unrestricted
power to remove the trustee is considered to have a general power
of appointment if the beneficiary can only replace a trustee with
another independent trustee. In the past the I.R.S. has attributed
the powers of the trustee with discretionary powers of distribution
to a settlor, who retained the power to remove an independent trus37
tee without cause and appoint a new independent trustee. The
underlying assumption of the I.R.S. was that every trustee, including a corporate trustee, would be compelled to follow the bidding
of a settlor who has the unrestricted power to remove the trustee
36. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b) (as amended in 1961) (emphasis added).
37. Rev. Rul. 79-353, 1979-2 C.B. 325 (1979).
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because the settlor will always be able to find another corporate
trustee to act as the settlor wishes.
This argument that the independent trustee will invariably do
38
the settlor’s bidding failed in Estate of Wall v. Commissioner. The
reason this argument failed is because it disregarded the fact that
the trustee would violate the fiduciary duty it owes beneficiaries if
it takes action that the trustee would not otherwise take merely be39
cause the trustee could be replaced. As a result of this decision,
the I.R.S. pronounced a new position in Revenue Ruling 95-58,
finding that a settlor’s power to remove and replace an independent trustee, who has the power to make discretionary distributions,
with another independent trustee will not cause the trust assets to
be brought back into the settlor’s taxable estate under I.R.C. sec40
tions 2036 and 2038.
Despite the holding of Revenue Ruling 95-58, it is still uncertain whether a discretionary beneficiary can have unrestricted
power to remove an independent trustee and replace him with another independent trustee without causing the trust assets to be
brought back into the beneficiary’s estate. In a private letter ruling, which cannot be used as precedent by other taxpayers, the
I.R.S. stated that a beneficiary can have the power to remove and
replace an independent trustee of a wholly discretionary trust with
another independent trustee without the trustee’s discretionary
41
powers of distribution being attributed to the beneficiary.
However, this ruling does not adequately differentiate between those I.R.C. sections applicable to a settlor and those that
are applicable to a beneficiary. The issue for a settlor is whether or
not the retained power to change the corporate trustee can be
equated with a power to designate the persons who are to possess
or enjoy the trust property. Possession or enjoyment would require
the trust assets to be included in the settlor’s estate. It is the fiduciary duty that the trustee owes to the beneficiaries, which remains
unaffected by the settlor’s removal and replacement power, that
prevents the attribution of the trustee’s actions to the settlor.
When a beneficiary has an unqualified power to remove and
replace the trustee, the issue is whether the beneficiary indirectly
has the power to consume, invade or appropriate property for his
benefit. Arguably, it is possible for a trustee of a discretionary
trust to make a complete distribution of the trust assets to a beneficiary, having the power to remove and replace the trustee, without
38.
39.
40.
41.

101 T.C. 153, 159 (1993).
Id.
Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191 (1995).
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-46-007 (Aug. 11, 1997).
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the trustee violating its fiduciary duties. As a result, a beneficiary
may not be able to make the same argument that was made by the
settlor in Estate of Wall that the trustee’s fiduciary duty remains
unaffected by a beneficiary’s power to remove and replace the trustee. In fact, in subsequent rulings the I.R.S. now appears to be
leaning towards the position that a discretionary beneficiary with
an unqualified power to remove an independent trustee, but having
only the power to replace the removed trustee with another independent trustee, is nonetheless considered to have a general power
42
of appointment with respect to the trust assets.
b. The Creditor Protection Problem. Aside from the potential tax problem, if maximum creditor protection is desired, a discretionary beneficiary should not be given an unrestricted power to
remove and replace the independent trustee with another independent trustee out of concern that the trustee’s power to make
discretionary distributions will be attributed to the beneficiary. If
the beneficiary has the power to make discretionary distributions
to himself, which is not limited by an ascertainable standard, a
beneficiary’s creditor could easily make the argument that the entire assets of the trust should be made available to the creditor.
Instead of giving a discretionary beneficiary an unrestricted
power to remove and replace the independent trustee, the trust instrument could name a trust protector who has an unrestricted
power to remove and replace the independent trustee. The trust
protector would need to be independent of the beneficiary within
43
the meaning of I.R.C. section 672(c). The difficulty with using a
trust protector is that dynasty trusts can extend beyond the lifetime
of anyone in existence at the time the trust is established. As a result, the built-in limitation exists that this individual will not be
around for future generations of trust beneficiaries. One solution
is to give the initial trust protector the ability to appoint a successor
trust protector who in turn has the power to appoint a successor
trust protector.
How does one remove an unwanted trust protector? It would
appear dangerous for both tax and creditor protection reasons to
give a discretionary beneficiary the unrestricted power to remove
and replace a trust protector with another trust protector for the
same reasons that the beneficiary should not be given the unrestricted power to remove and replace an independent trustee. It
42. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-31-008 (Apr. 18, 2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-20-010
(Feb. 15, 2000); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-24-011 (Mar. 7, 2000).
43. I.R.C. § 672(c) (2001) (defining who or what is a related or subordinate
party).
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would be far too easy to impute the distribution authority of the
independent trustee to the beneficiary if the beneficiary has the unrestricted power to remove and replace a trust protector, who in
turn has the unrestricted power to remove and replace the independent trustee.
To protect against tax and creditor protection problems, if a
discretionary beneficiary is given the power to remove the trustee
44
it should only be “for reasonable cause.” A list of items that con45
stitute reasonable cause should be included. Preferable still, if a
discretionary trust is involved, it would be prudent to include an
independent trust protector, giving the trust protector the sole
authority to remove the trustee. The trust protector could have an
unrestricted right to remove the trustee, but it would be far safer,
at least for creditor protection purposes, to limit the removal power
“for reasonable cause.” If a trust protector is named, a discretionary beneficiary should not have the power to remove the trust protector but only the power to appoint a successor trust protector
should the original trust protector resign.

44. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-03-018 (Oct. 23, 1992). In this private letter ruling, the
I.R.S. considered acceptable (i) the legal incapacity of the trustee; (ii) the willful
or negligent mismanagement by the trustee of trust assets; (iii) the abuse or abandonment of, or inattention to, the trust by the trustee; (iv) a federal or state charge
against the trustee involving the commission of a felony or serious misdemeanor;
(v) an act of stealing, dishonesty, fraud, embezzlement, moral turpitude or moral
degeneration by the trustee; (vi) the trustee’s use of narcotics or excessive
amounts of alcohol; (vii) the trustee’s poor physical, mental or emotional health
that causes the trustee to be unable to devote sufficient time to administer the
trust; (viii) the trustee’s failure to comply with a written agreement regarding
compensation or any other legally enforceable written agreement affecting the
trust’s operation; (ix) the failure of a corporate trustee to appoint a senior officer
with at least five years of experience in administering trusts to handle the account;
(x) changes by a corporate trustee in the account office responsible for handling
the trust account more frequently than every five years; (xi) the relocation of the
trustee away from the location where the trust operates so as to interfere with the
administration of the trust; (xii) a demand for unreasonable compensation; or
(xiii) any other reason for which a court of competent jurisdiction would remove a
trustee.
45. Id.
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B. Naming an Independent Trustee and Entitling the Beneficiary
to Distributions Relating to the Beneficiary’s Health,
Education, Maintenance and Support, Coupled with a
Spendthrift Provision
A beneficial interest naming an independent trustee but entitling the beneficiary to distributions relating to an ascertainable
standard could be drafted in the following manner:
The trustee shall pay over or apply the net income and
principal thereof, to such extent, including the whole
thereof, as the trustee may determine necessary for the
beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support
in the beneficiary’s accustomed manner of living.
If it is decided that it is better to give the beneficiary a right to trust
distributions, the trustee could be instructed to make distributions
limited to an ascertainable standard relating to the health, education, maintenance and support of the beneficiary. The Second Restatement takes the position that “support” trusts cannot be
reached by a beneficiary’s general creditors, with or without spendthrift protection, because it is the nature of the beneficiary’s interest rather than a provision forbidding alienation that prevents the
46
transfer of the beneficiary’s interest. In other words, trust assets
may only be used for the restricted purpose set forth in the trust
(i.e. the beneficiary’s support). Nonetheless, the Second Restatement does provide an exception for certain special claimants, such
as children, spouses and ex-spouses, suppliers of necessaries and
governmental units who can reach the beneficial interest in satis47
faction of their claims. Even then, a court must first determine
what might reasonably be available to the beneficiary without unduly affecting the interests of remainder beneficiaries, as well as
48
the beneficiary’s own needs.
The Second Restatement goes on to say that the interest of a
beneficiary may be reached in other cases if considerations of pub49
lic policy so require. It specifically mentions that it might be possible for a person who has a claim in tort to reach the beneficiary’s
50
interest in trust. The Mississippi Supreme Court alluded to this

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959).
Id. § 157(a).
See id. at cmt. b.
Id. at cmt. a.
Id.
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exception in Sligh v. First National Bank,51 where the court held
that the trust assets could be attached by a creditor of a discretionary beneficiary, even though the creditor’s claim defeated the re52
mainderman’s interests. Interestingly, Mississippi’s own legislature rejected the holding of its highest court by passing a law within
six months that effectively overturned the precedential value of this
53
decision. The decision in Sligh was an aberration as demonstrated
by the commentary contained in the Third Restatement, which, as
far-reaching as it is in protecting creditor rights, soundly rejects the
holding of the Sligh case as being excessive and inappropriate be54
cause the holding defeated the remainderman’s interest.
The advantage of an Alaska dynasty trust is that the spendthrift protection of Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110(b) prevails
over the claims of all creditors not specifically exempted in the
statute, irrespective of whether the creditor is a special claimant as
55
defined in the Second and Third Restatements. However, so as
not to confuse what the settlor may have intended when providing
that the trustee shall make distributions to the beneficiary for his
support in his accustomed manner of living, it would be best to
provide the additional restriction that only the support needs of the
beneficiary may be considered, and not the needs of those dependent upon the beneficiary.
From a purely tax perspective, there is no problem in giving a
beneficiary who is entitled to distributions limited to an ascertainable standard that relates to the beneficiary’s health, education,
maintenance and support an unrestricted right to remove and replace an independent trustee with another independent trustee.
51. 704 So.2d 1020 (Miss. 1997). Curiously, the trust established for the beneficiary was a discretionary trust and one must wonder why the court even became
involved with the spendthrift issue.
52. Id. at 1029.
53. MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-9-509 (Supp. 2001).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1999). The following example is given in the Third Restatement: F devised property to T to pay such amounts of income to or for support and welfare of his son,
B, and to distribute the trust estate upon B’s death to his issue. B’s interest has
been attached by a creditor, who has a very large property and personal injury
judgment against B resulting from an automobile accident. If it were determined
that payment of the claim would result in a significant impairment of the remainderman’s interest, the trustee could decide not to make a distribution to the
claimant. The conclusion one draws is that in the Third Restatement only where
the beneficiary was engaged in malicious or reckless behavior, and only after taking into account other beneficial interests, could a beneficiary’s interest in trust be
partially or entirely distributed to a tort claimant.
55. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b) (Michie 2000).
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The beneficiary will not be considered as having a general power of
appointment over the trust assets that would cause estate tax inclu56
sion.
C. Naming the Beneficiary as Trustee and Giving the Beneficiary
a Discretionary Interest Limited to an Ascertainable Standard
Relating to a Beneficiary’s Health, Education, Maintenance
and Support, Coupled with a Spendthift Provision
A dynasty trust could name a beneficiary as the sole trustee,
but the beneficial interest would be a discretionary interest limited
to an ascertainable standard relating to a beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support. The beneficial interest could be
described as follows:
The trustee may pay over or apply the net income and
principal thereof, to such extent, including the whole
thereof, as the trustee, in the exercise of sole and absolute
discretion, may determine, for and limited to the beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support in the
beneficiary’s accustomed manner of living. Any net income not so paid over or applied shall be accumulated and
added to the principal of the trust at least annually and
thereafter shall be held, administered and disposed of as a
part thereof. The limitation that payments may be made
or applied only for the beneficiary’s health, education,
maintenance and support in the beneficiary’s accustomed
manner of living shall not be interpreted as imposing a
duty, even if unreasonably withheld, on the trustee to
make distributions for the beneficiary’s health, education,
maintenance and support in the beneficiary’s accustomed
manner of living, but shall only set forth the maximum extent in which the trustee’s exercise of discretion may be
exercised. Moreover, only the support needs of the beneficiary may be considered and not the needs of those dependent upon the beneficiary.
At the other end of the continuum regarding beneficiary control, the beneficiary could serve as his own trustee, and he could be
entitled to discretionary distributions limited to an ascertainable
standard relating to the beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support. This type of trust is sometimes referred to as a
57
“beneficiary-controlled” dynasty trust. Care must be taken that
56. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1 (as amended in 1961).
57. R. OSHINS & S. OSHINS, Protecting & Preserving Wealth into the Next Millennium (pt. 1), 137 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 11, at 52, 60 (1998).
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the limitation (that distributions can be made only for the beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support in the beneficiary’s accustomed manner of living) is not interpreted as setting
forth a standard that requires the trustee to make distributions to
the beneficiary. In other words, the limitation should set forth only
a ceiling, and not a floor, in which the range of discretion may be
employed. The Second Restatement does not give the creditor
more rights if a beneficiary has been named as the sole trustee of
58
his trust, presumably because he would be subject to the same fiduciary standards (particularly those that might be owed to remaindermen) as would be applicable to an independent trustee.
As previously mentioned, under the Second Restatement, only
special claimants such as children, spouses and ex-spouses, providers of necessaries and governmental units would have a right to
reach the interest of the beneficiary in satisfaction of their claims.
The position taken in the Third Restatement differs markedly
with regard to the rights of creditors against a beneficiary who is a
trustee of his own trust. The Third Restatement’s position is that
spendthrift provisions are disregarded when the beneficiary is also
the trustee. The result is that not only do the special claimants referred to above have a right to reach the beneficial interest, but any
claimant can reach the maximum amount that the beneficiary could
distribute to himself without the distribution being considered an
59
abuse of discretion. The Third Restatement states any fiduciary
position that the beneficiary occupies can be disregarded, and it describes the beneficiary’s fiduciary rights as a limited form of owner60
ship analogous to certain general powers. These rather harsh re61
sults do not apply if an independent co-trustee is appointed. In
jurisdictions where a current beneficiary cannot serve as sole trustee without leaving the trust vulnerable to creditor claims, it would
be desirable to name an independent co-trustee who would be
solely responsible for distributions.
The advantage of the Alaska dynasty trust, irrespective of the
position taken in the Second or the Third Restatement, is that a
beneficiary can be named as the trustee of his own trust, and the
spendthrift protection of Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110(b)
would prevail over the claim of a creditor, special claimant or otherwise. In addition, its simplicity in approach may make the trust
more palatable to the settlor and the beneficiary who does not
58.
59.
1999).
60.
61.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. m (1959).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2,
Id.
Id.
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want an independent trustee to become involved in the family’s financial matters.
D. A Blended Approach with an Independent Trustee as Either a
Successor Trustee or an Originally Appointed Co-Trustee
In sum, the basic theme of the three previous approaches is
that in jurisdictions where creditor protection is desired and adequate spendthrift protection cannot be provided, it is best for the
trust to be discretionary and for the trustee to be independent.
Even though it is not necessary to have an independent trustee in
order to have creditor protection in Alaska, if maximum creditor
protection is desired, it is probably wise to have an independent
trustee who has the sole power to make discretionary distributions.
One approach is to draft a trust in which the beneficiary as the sole
trustee can make discretionary distributions to himself limited to
an ascertainable standard relating to the beneficiary’s health, education, maintenance and support in his accustomed manner of living, but further providing that in the event of his resignation as
trustee, an independent trustee would replace him as the trustee.
An alternative approach is to make the beneficiary-trustee a cotrustee with another independent trustee from the outset.
The advantage of the first approach is that it gives the beneficiary control when creditor protection is not a concern and gives
the beneficiary the ability to turn over control should a creditor
concern arise in the future. The disadvantage of this approach is
that it might appear that the beneficiary has transferred something
of value by resigning as a trustee in favor of an independent trustee, especially if the resignation comes shortly after a creditor
problem arises. It should be mentioned that this perceived disadvantage has no legal foundation, since a beneficiary who serves as a
trustee is still a fiduciary, and the spendthrift protection of Alaska
Statutes section 34.40.110(b) does not differentiate on the basis of
who is serving as trustee. Alternatively, the trust instrument could
provide that upon the beneficiary relinquishing his position as sole
trustee, an independent co-trustee named in the instrument would
thereupon be appointed. The independent co-trustee would have
the sole authority to make distributions, with the beneficiary being
retained as a co-trustee with the authority over investments and the
administrative aspects of the trust. In order to provide a jurisdictional nexus to Alaska, it is important that the administrative func62
tions of the trust be served by an Alaskan trustee.

62. ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c)(3) (Michie 2000).

GREER_FMT.DOC

274

11/01/01 3:16 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[18:2

The second, and perhaps better, approach is to have the beneficiary serve at the outset as a co-trustee with an independent trustee, where the independent trustee has the sole authority concerning distributions. The beneficiary could continue to have authority
concerning investments and, provided the beneficiary is domiciled
in Alaska, authority over the administrative aspects of the trust. At
any point in time, the beneficiary could relinquish the investment
and administrative functions in favor of an independent trustee.
Having an independent trustee solely responsible for distribution
decisions from the outset would be the preferred approach if there
is concern that a subsequent resignation of the beneficiary as the
sole trustee in favor of an independent trustee would compromise
the protection given the beneficial interest. The right to remove
and replace the independent trustee could continue to be given to
the beneficiary, provided the beneficial interest is not wholly discretionary but is limited to an ascertainable standard. However, it
is preferable for both tax and creditor protection purposes to give
the beneficiary the power to remove the independent trustee only
“for reasonable cause,” as defined in the trust document.
IV. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
A. Powers of Appointment and Creditor Claims
As previously mentioned, dynasty trusts exempt from the GST
tax will typically give beneficiaries a testamentary non-general
power of appointment. A testamentary non-general power of appointment allows a beneficiary to alter the disposition of assets as
set forth in a settlor’s dispositive plan. Giving beneficiaries powers
of appointment resolves, in many respects, the argument against
dynasty trusts that property interests should be controlled by the
63
living and not by a settlor’s “dead hand.”
As might be expected, appointive assets covered by a testamentary non-general power of appointment cannot be attached by
a beneficiary’s creditor or the expenses of administration of a bene64
ficiary’s estate. Even if a beneficiary is given a testamentary general power of appointment, as would typically be the case in a nonexempt dynasty trust, the trust assets cannot be subjected to the
claims of the beneficiary’s creditors, unless and only to the extent

63. See Ira Mark Bloom, The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569, 570-71 (2000) (providing a discussion of past and present reasons for the rule).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 (1986).
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provided by statute.65 It is important to note that the tax goal of
having the assets of a non-exempt trust included in the beneficiary’s estate can be accomplished without the donee being consid66
ered the owner of the trust for creditor protection purposes. This
is the Second Restatement’s position as it relates to both an unexercised testamentary general power of appointment and an unexercised but presently exercisable general power of appointment. The
theory is that until the donee exercises the power, he has not accepted control over the appointive assets that gives the donee the
67
equivalent of ownership. However, under the Second Restatement if a testamentary or a presently exercisable general power of
appointment is exercised, the appointive assets can be subjected to
68
the payment of claims against the beneficiary’s estate.
The Third Restatement differs from the Second Restatement
in that it treats an individual with an unexercised but presently exercisable general power of appointment as the owner of the prop69
erty over which the rights could be exercised. A presently exercisable right of withdrawal is treated as a presently exercisable
general power of appointment. Thus, all assets that could be withdrawn by the donee of a presently exercisable general power of appointment are subject to claims of the beneficiary’s creditors. This
arguably could compromise irrevocable trusts where a beneficiary
70
is given Crummey withdrawal rights. Under the Third Restatement, during the time a beneficiary has withdrawal rights, the trust
is considered self-settled to the full extent that the beneficiary has
such withdrawal rights. The Uniform Trust Code differs from the
Third Restatement in this regard by considering the trust self65. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-22-13 (1956), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 (1986) (going further than the
Restatement by specifically rejecting creditor claims against donees of a power of
appointment, whether non-general or general).
66. I.R.C. § 2041(a) (2001).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2 (1986).
68. Id. § 13.4, 13.5.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 (1959).
70. See Crummey v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968),
rev’g Crummey v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966). To qualify a gift
for the annual exemption the gift must be of a present interest. Typically gifts in
trust are not of a present interest because the beneficiaries have only a future right
to the gift as dictated by the terms of the trust. To convert what would otherwise
be a gift of a future interest into a gift of a present interest that qualifies for the
gift tax annual exemption, beneficiaries are given an immediate right to withdraw
the settlor’s contribution to the trust for a limited period of time. Typically this is
thirty to sixty days. If the right is not exercised, it lapses, and the contribution remains in the trust to be used as the trustee directs.
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settled only to the extent the withdrawal right exceeds the greater
of $5,000 or 5% of the trust estate or the gift tax annual exclusion
71
amount. To the extent a trust is considered self-settled, under
both the Third Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code, any
spendthrift restraint will be held invalid as to that portion subject
to a beneficiary’s withdrawal rights, leaving the trust assets vulner72
able to the beneficiary’s creditors. This will not be the result under Alaska law because self-settled trusts are recognized in Alaska,
73
but this is only true if the beneficiary interest is discretionary.
B. Powers of Appointment and the Delaware Tax Trap
Generally, the exercise of a testamentary non-general power
of appointment will not result in the trust assets being included in
the gift or estate tax base of the beneficiary who exercises that
power. An exception exists when the beneficiary exercises a testamentary non-general power of appointment in a manner that
causes the beneficiary to fall into the “Delaware Tax Trap.” The
Delaware Tax Trap is sprung in a state that has totally eliminated
the Rule Against Perpetuities if a beneficiary exercises a nongeneral power of appointment to create a further trust, giving a
successive beneficiary a non-general power of appointment. The
result is that all trust assets subject to the exercise of the beneficiary’s non-general power of appointment are exposed to the gift or
estate tax, depending on when the beneficiary exercised the nongeneral power of appointment. This exposure could prove devastating to the beneficiary who unwittingly falls into the trap. This
deficiency in Alaska state law brought about the enactment of
Alaska’s present Rule Against Perpetuities, as well as a new rule
74
governing the suspension of the power of alienation.
To fully understand the Delaware Tax Trap, one must first
have a basic understanding of the Rule Against Perpetuities and
75
the manner in which powers of appointment fit into this rule. The
71. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2) (2000).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 illus. 2, 11 (Tentative Draft No. 2,
1999); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(3) (Michie 2000).
74. Id. § 34.27.051. This statute was signed into law on April 22, 2000, but is
retroactive to April 2, 1997. In addition, the new Alaska Statutes section
34.27.100 added a rule governing the suspension of the power of alienation. These
provisions were amended again by the twenty-second Legislature, and the
amendments were signed into law on April 28, 2001, effective immediately.
75. For a thorough discussion of the Delaware Tax Trap, see Stephen E.
Greer, The Delaware Tax Trap and the Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities,
EST. PLAN., Feb. 2001, at 68.
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common law Rule Against Perpetuities and the USRAP both provide that the validity of an interest in trust created by the exercise
of a non-general or testamentary general power of appointment is
76
measured from the date the original trust was created. Thus, the
measuring period for determining the validity of non-vested interests created by the exercise of a non-general or a testamentary
general power of appointment “relates back” to the date the origi77
nal trust was created. The “relation back” doctrine not only determines the inception of the time period in which trust interests
must vest, but it also determines the inception of the time period in
which non-general and testamentary general powers of appoint78
ment must be exercised. As a result, under both the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities and the USRAP, when the donee of a
non-general power of appointment (the first power) exercises it by
giving a beneficiary the further ability to exercise a non-general
power of appointment (the second power), the time period in
which an interest created by the second power must vest is measured by calculating the perpetuities period from the date of the
79
trust instrument creating the first power.
In a jurisdiction that has abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is no stated period of time within which a property interest must vest. Whenever a power of appointment is exercised to
create a successive non-general power of appointment, the property subject to this power will have its vesting postponed for a period of time that cannot be ascertained by referring back to the
date of the instrument creating the first power of appointment.
“There is no ‘period’ ascertainable by reference to the date [a] . . .
power was created, because there is no rule against perpetuities
80
and thus there simply is no ‘period.’” Thus, all trust property
subject to the exercise of a non-general power of appointment, exercised to create a trust giving a succeeding beneficiary a nongeneral power of appointment, renders that property subject to
federal estate tax or federal gift tax.

76. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER, ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE
INTERESTS IN A NUTSHELL §§ 16.1(d), 16.2 (2d ed. 1993).
77. The “relation back” doctrine does not apply to a presently exercisable
general power of appointment, which is the equivalent of ownership for perpetuities purposes. See id. § 16.1(d).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.2(h)
(1986).
79. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 2 (amended 1990), 88 U.L.A.
359 (1993).
80. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON REAL PROPERTY & PROBATE, 2000 Leg., 21st
Sess., ANALYSIS HB 599, at 4 (Fla. 2000).
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C. Evolvement of Alaska Law to Avoid the Delaware Tax Trap
Alaska’s first attempt to permit the creation of dynasty trusts
was in 1997. Alaska Statutes section 34.27.050 was amended to
state that “a nonvested property interest is invalid unless the interest is in a trust, and all or part of the income or principal of the
trust may be distributed, in the discretion of the trustee, to a person
81
who is living when the trust is created.” Under the terms of that
statute, several problems were discovered.
First, it was unclear whether a charitable lead dynasty trust
could be created in Alaska. This is a trust in which a charity is
given a right to receive an annuity or unitrust interest, usually for a
term of years, followed by a gift-over to non-charitable beneficiaries. The transfer tax value of the ultimate gift-over to the settlor’s
non-charitable beneficiaries must be actuarially reduced to take
into account the charity’s interest. This is an effective way to reduce the federal transfer tax on the amount that the non-charitable
beneficiaries will ultimately receive. Under the terms of the former
statute, it was unclear whether the gift-over to the non-charitable
beneficiaries could be in the form a dynasty trust because it was
unclear whether a charity was a “person” within the meaning of the
statute. If charities were not included in the definition of a “person,” then the unrepealed USRAP provisions would apply with respect to the future interests of the non-charitable beneficiaries.
Second, there was an additional concern that it might not be
possible to create dynasty trusts that are initially funded with assets
82
in which beneficiaries are given Crummey withdrawal rights. If
the gift to the trustee is subject to an immediate right of withdrawal
free from interference by the trustee, then under the terms of the
statute, income or principal cannot be distributed in the trustee’s
discretion to a person who is living when the trust is created. This
is because the trustee cannot make a distribution of trust assets
during the time the beneficiaries have withdrawal rights and thus
the trust cannot be perpetual. Instead, the trust interests would
have to vest within the period set forth in USRAP.
Third, although under the former statute a trust could be perpetual with no requirement that beneficial interests vest within the
period set forth in USRAP, there was also no required period
within which property “must” vest. Therefore, if a beneficiary exercised a non-general power of appointment to create a trust giving
a successive beneficiary a non-general power of appointment, the

81. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.050(a)(3) (repealed 2000).
82. Crummey v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968),
rev’g Crummey v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966).
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property subject to this power would have its vesting postponed for
a period of time not ascertainable by referring back to the date of
the instrument creating the first power of appointment. As a result, a beneficiary who exercised the non-general power of appointment fell into the Delaware Tax Trap. However, it was
doubtful a beneficiary would ever fall into the Delaware Tax Trap
because of an equally troublesome problem. The former statute
left in place a USRAP provision that contingent non-general powers of appointment could be validly exercised only within the
USRAP period. As a result, any attempt to exercise a non-general
power of appointment to create a successive non-general power of
appointment beyond the statutory period permitted under USRAP
would simply be invalid.
It was important to do two things so that non-general powers
of appointment could be safely given to beneficiaries of dynasty
trusts. First, the time period of the Rule Against Perpetuities
needed to be extended instead of abolished so that there would be
a period of time within which property subject to a non-general
power of appointment, exercised to create a successive power of
appointment, must vest; second, the length of time within which
powers of appointment could be exercised must be extended to
that same period of time. On April 22, 2000, the former USRAP
provisions were repealed, and Alaska Statutes section 34.27.051
83
was enacted in its place. Alaska Statutes section 34.27.051 states
that non-general and testamentary powers of appointment must be
exercised within 1,000 years from the date of the instrument creat84
ing the original power of appointment. This same section states
that in the limited circumstance where a non-general power of appointment is exercised to create a successive non-general power of
appointment or a successive testamentary general power of appointment, all property interests must vest within 1,000 years of the
creation of the original instrument creating the original non85
general power of appointment.
Because the ability of a beneficiary to fall into the Delaware
Tax Trap might be desirable if it is better to have the property
subjected to estate or gift tax rather than generation-skipping tax,
as is typically the case in non-exempt trusts, this was explicitly pro-

83. See H.R. 34, 22 Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2001); S. 162, 21 Leg., 1st Sess.
(Alaska 2000).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051(a) (Michie 2000).
85. Id. § 34.27.051(c).
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vided for in Alaska Statutes section 34.27.051(b).86 In that subsection, a new perpetuities period commences when a presently exer87
cisable power of appointment is created. These new provisions
were retroactive to April 2, 1997, at the time when perpetual trusts
88
became possible in Alaska. The ability to make these provisions
89
retroactive is sanctioned in section 5(a) of USRAP. This section
provides that with respect to a non-vested property interest and a
power of appointment created by the exercise of a power of appointment, the law in effect at the time a power of appointment is
exercised to create a successive power of appointment controls. In
other words, even though a trust instrument might have been created prior to the enactment of USRAP, if at a later point in time a
power of appointment is exercised, the law in effect at the time the
power of appointment is exercised determines the validity of the
exercise and the validity of all interests created by that exercise.
The purpose of that provision was to make USRAP’s “wait and
see” period of ninety years applicable to trust instruments created
prior to the enactment of USRAP.
In addition to radically changing our Rule Against Perpetuities, a new rule against the suspension of the power of alienation
90
(the “Alienability Rule”) was passed. This rule actually promotes
the same goals as the common law Rule Against Perpetuities. The
primary aim is to make the trust property freely alienable within a
defined period of time. In fact, many states have abolished the
Rule Against Perpetuities in favor of an Alienability Rule. Those
states are Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, South Da91
The central purpose behind the Rule
kota, and Wisconsin.
Against Perpetuities is to require all future interests to vest within
a required period of time. Once all interests have vested, it is possible, particularly when a trust is not involved, to value those interests so the property can then be sold. The Alienability Rule was
interpreted to mean the following—not later than the end of a
86. Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Jeffrey N. Pennell, Adventures in GenerationSkipping, or How We Learned to Love the “Delaware Tax Trap,” 24 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 75, 87-88 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051(b) (Michie 2000).
87. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.051(b).
88. Id. § 34.27.070(c).
89. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 5(a) (amended 1990),
8b U.L.A. 375 (1993).
90. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100 (Michie 2000).
91. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/4(a)(2) (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, § 101-A (West Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., [Estates & Trusts] § 11102 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:2F-9 (West Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2131.09 (West 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-6-3 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 700.16 (West 2001).
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permissible period, there must exist persons in being who, alone or
in combination with others, can convey an absolute fee in land or
full ownership of personalty. The test is whether the trust would or
could end during the permissible period, thus providing the benefi92
ciaries the ability to sell the trust assets. As originally formulated,
the power of alienation had to reside in the beneficiaries. The requirement that the beneficiaries be given the power of sale has
been statutorily changed in those states adopting the Alienability
Rule. In these states, there is either an explicit or implicit statement that the power of alienation is not suspended with respect to
property held in trust if a trustee is given a power of sale over the
trust assets. Alaska Statutes section 34.27.100 states that the power
of alienation must not be suspended beyond a period measured by
93
lives in being plus thirty years. At the same time, this statute provides that the power of alienation is not suspended if a trustee is
94
given a power of sale over the subject property.
In Alaska, the principal reason for the adoption of the Alienability Rule is to ensure the alienability of property held in trust,
and also to fit within the holding of Estate of Murphy v. Commis95
sioner. In Estate of Murphy, a beneficiary of a Wisconsin trust exercised a power of appointment by creating another power in her
husband, which he in turn could validly exercise by placing the
property subject to the power in a perpetual trust for the benefit of
96
his children and descendants. The federal government’s position
was that the Delaware Tax Trap provisions of I.R.C. section
97
However, the tax court held that section
2041(a)(3) applied.
2041(a)(3) required only an examination of applicable local law to
determine whether there was a postponement of vesting or a sus98
The court found section
pension of the power of alienation.
2041(a)(3) inapplicable because the trustee was given a power of
99
sale. Under Wisconsin law, the permissible alienation period is
100
Where the
measured from the date the first power is created.
92. I. Bloom, Transfer Tax Avoidance: The Impact of Perpetuities Restrictions
Before and After Generation-Skipping Taxation, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 261 (1981)
(discussing the history of the Rule Against Perpetuities and the rule against the
suspension of the power of alienation).
93. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100 (Michie 2000). This additional thirty-year period corresponds to Wisconsin law. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16(1)(a) (West 2001).
94. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.100(b)(2)(A) (Michie 2000).
95. 71 T.C. 671 (1979), acq. in result, 1979-2 C.B. 2.
96. Id. at 672-73.
97. Id. at 678.
98. Id. at 680.
99. Id. at 673 n.5.
100. Id. at 681.
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trustee is given a power of sale, the power of alienation is not suspended for a period of time that cannot be ascertained by referring
back to the date of the instrument creating the original power of
appointment. This is for the simple reason that the power of al101
ienation is never suspended, not even for a day. Thus, it is impossible to fall into the Delaware Tax Trap. The new Alienability
Rule was adopted in the event a tax court would find Alaska’s
1,000 year vesting period as being tantamount to an abolishment of
the Rule Against Perpetuities. Should that occur, under the Alienability Rule dynasty trusts would still be protected from the
Delaware Tax Trap under the holding of Estate of Murphy to
102
which the I.R.S. has acquiesced.
V. WILL ALASKA LAW CONTROL THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND SPENDTHRIFT ISSUE
FOR A NON-RESIDENT BENEFICIARY?
Which state law controls when an Alaskan settlor has an
Alaska governing law provision, but the beneficiaries reside in
other states? The answer to this question is critical to the settlor
because the underlying reason for creating the trust is to take advantage of Alaska law regarding the Rule Against Perpetuities and
103
spendthrift protection.
A. The Rule Against Perpetuities Issue
The Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws provides that
questions concerning the Rule Against Perpetuities are questions
104
of substantial validity. The Restatement’s position is that the validity of a trust is determined by the local law of the state designated by the settlor, provided the state has a substantial relation to
105
the trust. With respect to intervivos dynasty trusts, there is a substantial relation to the state if the settlor is a domiciliary of the
106
state when the trust is established. In the case of a testamentary
107
trust, the applicable law is that of the state where the settlor died.
Thus, Alaska law will control the Rule Against Perpetuities issue
when an Alaskan establishes an intervivos irrevocable dynasty trust
101. Although only in a rare trust would a trustee not be given the power of
sale, it would be wise to specifically grant this power in any dynasty trust.
102. 71 T.C. 671, acq. in result, 1979-2 C.B. 2.
103. This Article does not address the ability of a settlor who was never a resident of Alaska to designate Alaska as the controlling law.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 cmt. d (1971).
105. Id. § 269(b)(i).
106. Id. § 269 cmt. f.
107. Id.
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and when an Alaskan testator has established a dynasty trust in his
will. However, what if a testator creates a dynasty trust in his will
while domiciled in Alaska and thereafter moves and dies in another state that has not abolished the Rule Against Perpetuities?
Which state law controls for purposes of determining the Rule
Against Perpetuities—Alaska’s or the law of the state where the
settlor dies? The Restatement’s position is that the Alaska Rule
Against Perpetuities provision would continue to be valid in the
subsequent state, even though it would be invalid as violating the
108
perpetuity law of the testator’s domicile.
B. The Spendthrift Issue
There is an additional question as to whether a settlor’s
Alaska choice-of-law provision concerning Alaska spendthrift protection for the beneficiary will be upheld if the beneficiary is a non109
The controlling law for determining spendresident of Alaska.
thrift protection is the law of the state where the trust administra110
Thus, if the trust administration occurs in Alaska,
tion occurs.
the Alaska spendthrift provision will be upheld even if the benefi111
This result will occur even
ciaries are non-residents of Alaska.
though the trust lacks a specific provision indicating where the trust
112
is to be administered if the settlor names an Alaskan trustee.
C. Does Alaska Statutes Section 13.36.035(c) Impose an
Additional Requirement Before Alaska Law Can Apply?
Alaska Statutes section 13.36.035(c) provides that Alaska law
governs the validity, construction and administration of an Alaskan
trust. Moreover, a provision designating Alaskan law as controlling is valid, effective and conclusive for the trust, as long as one
113
has a trustee who is a “qualified person.” A “qualified person” is
114
defined as an Alaska trust company or an Alaskan individual.

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. § 269 cmts. i, j.
Id. § 273.
Id. at cmt. a.
Id.
Id. at cmt. c.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.035(c) (Michie 2000).
Under Alaska Statutes section 13.36.390(2), a “qualified person” means
(A) an individual who, except for brief intervals, military service, attendance at an educational or training institution, or for
absences for good cause shown, resides in this state, whose true
and permanent home is in this state, who does not have a present intention of moving from this state, and who has the intention of returning to this state when away;
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The question then becomes whether Alaska Statutes section
13.36.035(c) was intended to be the exclusive means through which
Alaska law could apply. Nothing in the language of section
13.36.035(c) suggests that this statute sets forth the exclusive means
for an Alaska choice-of-law provision to be upheld. Under the
general conflict of law principles set forth in the Second Conflict of
Laws Restatement, a settlor who has a nexus with Alaska (because
the settlor dies with Alaska as his domicile) or who had a nexus
with Alaska (because the settlor was domiciled in Alaska at the
time the trust was executed) could justifiably expect an Alaskan
governing law provision to be upheld with respect to perpetuity is115
It would seem imsues despite not having an Alaskan trustee.
plausible that section 13.36.035(c) would upset this expectation because the legislative intent behind section 13.36.390 was to provide
non-residents with a statutory nexus to Alaska so that Alaskan law
116
would apply to their trusts.
Nonetheless, to avoid any controversy as to whether Alaska
law is meant to govern both the perpetuities and spendthrift issues,
six provisions are suggested. First, there should be a governing law
provision providing that the validity and construction of all rights
under the document are governed by the law of Alaska. Second,
there should be a direct expression of intent that the administration
of the trust should occur in Alaska. Third, there should always be
one trustee who is a qualified person as defined in Alaska Statutes
117
section 13.36.390(2). Fourth, the duties of that trustee shall, at a
minimum, include the duty and responsibility to maintain the
books and records of the trust and to prepare or to arrange for the
preparation of the trust’s tax returns. Fifth, at least some of the
trust’s assets should be deposited in Alaska; and sixth, it should be
specifically stated that the spendthrift provisions enunciated in
Alaska Statutes section 34.40.110 apply to each and every trust cre118
ated by the terms of the instrument.

(B) a trust company that is organized under [Alaska Statutes
section] 06.25 and that has its principal place of business in this
state; or
(C) a bank that is organized under [Alaska Statutes section]
06.05, or a national banking association that is organized under
12 U.S.C. 21 - 216d, if the bank or national banking association
possesses and exercises trust powers and has its principal place
of business in this state.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.390(2) (Michie 2000).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269 (1971).
116. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.36.035(c), 13.36.390 (Michie 2000).
117. Id. § 13.36.035(c).
118. Id. § 34.40.110.
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VI. DRAFTING IN LIGHT OF EGTRRA
As indicated throughout this Article, EGTRRA has changed
the tax environment in which an estate plan drafter must work.
Undoubtably, the tax environment will continue to experience
change. The following two observations concern the drafting of
dynasty trusts in light of EGTRRA.
First, estate plans must remain flexible to meet future needs of
the beneficiaries and to avoid unintended and unforeseen tax consequences. In this regard, an important provision is the ability of
an independent trustee to change the terms of the trust, particularly those that are tax driven, should an amendment be advisable.
Alaska law now permits the beneficiaries to go to court to change
the terms of a trust to avoid an unintended or unexpected tax re119
sult. However, this still requires the involvement of a court. It
would be far more expedient to give an independent trustee the
non-judicial power to change the terms of the trust.
Second, section 542 of EGTRRA adds new I.R.C. section
1022(d)(1)(B)(iii), which becomes effective in 2010. The significance of the provision is that property over which the decedent
holds a power of appointment will not be eligible for the limited
120
basis adjustment available at death under EGTRRA. It may be
important for a beneficiary to give his heirs the advantage of a basis adjustment at death, particularly if all transfer taxes are eliminated and the only tax left is the income tax. After first considering any tax consequences to the beneficiaries, a method of
accomplishing this, and at the same time providing future flexibility, is to give an independent trustee the power to terminate the
trust by making a distribution of the trust assets to the then current
beneficiary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Alaska’s new Rule Against Perpetuities keeps Alaska on the
cutting edge of the nationwide trust industry. States that have
fallen into the Delaware Tax Trap when they abolished their Rule
Against Perpetuities or other states that are contemplating abolishing their Rule Against Perpetuities will look upon the Alaska
121
When one considers that the
statutes as a model to emulate.
119. Id. §§ 13.36.345-13.36.390.
120. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, § 542, 115 Stat. 38, (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1022(a)-(b)).
121. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Rhode Island and Virginia have all
fallen into the Delaware Tax Trap. See Stephen E. Greer, The Delaware Tax Trap
and the Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities, EST. PLAN., Feb. 2001, at 68.
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Delaware Tax Trap does not operate as a threat to an Alaskan dynasty trust, as it does in other jurisdictions that permit dynasty
trusts, and also the extent to which an Alaskan dynasty trust can
protect a beneficiary against claims brought by the beneficiary’s
creditors, there is probably no jurisdiction superior to Alaska in
which to form a dynasty trust.

